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THE ROLE OF LONG-TERM CREDIT BANKS 




The role of banks in financing Japan's post-war growth has been well-documented. At the 
same time, there has been increasing recognition that special relationships between certain banks 
and their customers - "the main bank system" - may have lowered various costs associated with 
bank debt in Japan, and be partially responsible for the extraordinary reliance on bank debt for 
most of the post-war period. 
One problem with the provision of long-term investment financing by commercial banks is 
that it can put at risk the uninterrupted provision of liquidity services to the population at large. 
Though economic models often abstract away from this problem with the assumption that banks 
providing liquidity services have the ability to diversify away the long-term risk of their outstanding 
loans, regulators have rarely been so sanguine. In general, the U.S. has depended on the existence 
of well-developed securities markets to supplement and in many cases replace the provision of 
long-term debt by commercial banks. In Japan - particularly the Japan of the high-growth era -
the answer has lain rather in the creation of special classes of banks whose principal sources of 
financing are other than individual deposits. This paper examines one such class of institution -
that of the long-term credit banks. 
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The long-term credit banks differ from the other principal private suppliers of long-term 
loans in post-war Japan - the trust banks - in two major respects. One is that because they have 
access to fixed rate long-term financing, they have been able to make the provision of fixed rate 
long-term loans their principal business. Secondly, the long-term credit banks do not have an 
exclusive affiliation with any of the six major corporate groups which lie at the core of the main 
bank system in Japan. While the trust banks either lent to designated sectors or supplemented the 
loans of their group's city bank, and as a result have been traditionally weak in credit analysis, the 
long-term credit banks have built up substantial in-house credit analysis capability, and loaned 
across corporate groups to the principal players in major industries.1 
Interpretations of the role of the long-term credit banks within the Japanese financial 
system have varied. In views which stress the government control over credit allocation, emphasis 
is placed on the governmental origins of the long-term credit banks, and the government's use of 
them to channel long-term funds to designated sectors. In another view more popular among 
economists and consistent with the above-mentioned public policy concern, the existence of long-
term credit banks, along with their participation in financial consortia, has assured maturity 
transformation in Japan.2 
Japanese insurance companies have also provided long-term fixed rate loans to industry. At 
the end of 1980, life insurance companies were providing 5 trillion yen of outstanding industrial 
equipment loans, compared to 9.6 and 10.6 for the long-term credit and trust banks, respectively. 
(Bronte: 105) Like the trust banks, most insurance companies belong to an industrial group, lend 
principally to the firms within those groups, and are only rarely the largest lender to any particular 
borrower. 
Tor a cogent statement in English of the latter point of view, which also emphasizes the 
Japan Development Bank, see Sakakibaraet al (1982). Although the two views are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, an emphasis on the mechanics of maturity transformation does not rule out 
lending decisions based primarily on economic considerations. 
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While both of the above interpretations have to one degree or another been correct at 
different intervals (the former for a more limited time period), neither explicitly places the long-
term credit banks within the system of "main bank" relationships which has become a defining 
characteristic of the Japanese financial system. The underlying premise of this paper is that the 
long-term credit banks have provided an important counter-balance to aspects of the "main bank" 
system which are potentially negative: namely, commercial banks tied too closely to companies may 
assume an inappropriately high level of risk; banks whose principal clients are based on exclusive 
historical groupings may pay too little attention to important unaffiliated companies, and may be 
unable to broker important information flows and tie-ups with companies of other groups. The 
existence of long-term credit banks with a neutral stance among the six bank-centered keiretsu, 
which bring both active and knowledgeable participation to the syndication of credits, and provide a 
source of main bank services to large companies outside the principal bank groups has helped to 
minimize the potential drawbacks to the group-oriented main bank system. In coordination with 
government policy, long-term credit banks have been able to provide services to entire industries in 
decline and transition, helping to coordinate those efforts that are required across groups. 
The paper will proceed in three principal parts. In the first section to follow, we review 
the origins and identify in detail the important legal and institutional features which distinguish the 
long-term credit banks. We will concentrate in particular on the issuance of financial debentures, 
as the use and exclusivity of this privilege has been an central issue in long-term financing. In the 
next section, we survey cooperative financing by the long-term credit banks, both with the Japan 
Development Bank, and with the other private banks. In section 4, we examine more closely the 
role of the long-term credit banks as main banks, concentrating in particular on certain aspects of 
the history of the Industrial Bank of Japan. We end the paper with a brief conclusion. 
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II. The Origins and Distinctive Features of the Long-Term Credit Banks. 
2.1 Origins and Rebirth. The establishment in Japan of institutions specializing in long-
term credit occurred at the turn of the twentieth century, and thus postdate by a few decades the 
start of Japan's modernization and establishment of a modern banking system.3 Prior to their 
establishment, long-term funding needs had been principally met by the issuance of stock and loans 
from ordinary banks which were secured by the stocks of the company. These stocks in turn served 
as collateral for bank bills which were discounted at the central bank, guaranteeing commercial 
bank liquidity. Concerned that the provision of funds for fixed investment was not proper for 
ordinary commercial banks, and that the acceptance of corporate stock as collateral was not a 
proper activity of the Central Bank (IBJ, 2-3), Meiji oligarch Matsukata had long planned for the 
creation of special banks, but it took many years to overcome the opposition from private 
financiers, and to pass legislation enabling the creation of specialized long-term credit banks based 
largely on the French model. 
The Hypothec Bank of Japan (Nippon Kangvo Ginko) was established in 1898, which 
supplied long-term funds to agriculture and related industries secured by real estate.4 In 1901, the 
Colonial Bank of Hokkaido (Hokkaido Takushoku Ginko) was established to finance the 
development of Hokkaido also specializing in loans secured by real estate. In 1903, the Industrial 
3For a complete discussion and analysis of the development of the Japanese banking system 
during the Meiji period, see Patrick (1967), and the sources cited therein. 
^The Law governing the activities of the Hypothec Bank was passed a year earlier in 1897. 
Another bank, Noko Ginko, which specialized in lending to smaller agricultural businesses, was also 
established to specialize in loans secured by real estate. This was later absorbed into the Hypothec 
Bank in 1934. In addition to agriculture, the Hypothec Bank made an equal proportion of loans to 
light manufacturing industry (e.g., cotton textiles). (Patrick, 1967) 
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Bank of Japan (Nihon Kogvo Ginko) was established to specialize in long-term loans in 
manufacturing and railways secured by movable property. (IBJ, 4-6; Fukuzawa, 3) 
Though privately capitalized, the officers and directors of these banks were appointed by 
the Ministry of Finance, and thus were effectively government institutions. All three of the special 
banks were allowed to issue debentures as a means of long-term fund raising, most of which were 
purchased by the Ministry of Finance Deposit Bureau which drew funds from the Postal Savings 
System. 
However, the emergence of these banks did not mean that ordinary banks ceased their 
long-term lending. The long-term banks were meant to serve as a supplement to ordinary bank 
lending, and while the quantity of short-term loans the special banks could make was limited, at no 
time was the maturity structure of the loan portfolio of ordinary banks limited by statutory 
regulation.5 Nonetheless, concurrent with the industrialization of the Japanese economy, the 
special banks emerged as more than supplementary institutions. In particular, as government 
controls became more pronounced in the war economy, IBJ assumed an ever more central role in 
managing syndicated financing of the military buildup, a fact which has been touched on elsewhere 
in this volume (Teranishi; see also Table 8 of Hoshi, 1993). 
The institutions specializing in long-term lending suffered a short death, at least in theory, 
after the Second World War during the Allied Occupation. In April 1950, all of the special banks 
laws were abolished and distinctions between all banks apparently eliminated. However, historical 
accounts relate that more than one year earlier in November 1948, IBJ had already overcome 
5By contrast, the French system of long-term credit banks, upon which Japan's system was 
based, limited the ability of ordinary banks to make long-term loans. 
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' initial resistance6 and obtained the oral approval of occupation authorities to recapitalize as a bank 
specializing in long-term credit with bond issuing authority.7 Approval was conditioned on, among 
other things, restrictions on deposit-taking, and the elimination of governmental authority. 
Consistent with the agreement, EBJ not only recapitalized but proceeded to raise funds under a 
special new law passed in 1949 which temporarily permitted IBJ to issue debentures up to twenty 
times capital. 
Simultaneous with the abolition of the special bank laws in 1950, a new law was passed 
which allowed all banks to issue debentures if the sum of outstanding debentures and deposits were 
less than 20 times capital. Nonetheless, only the former special banks were able issue debentures 
since the city banks' many deposits and low capital placed them above the limit. (Kinyu Seido 
Chosakai Senmon Iinkai Hokoku, 111,6) By this point, occupation authorities were clearly favoring 
the former special banks, as special assistance funds were used to purchase their issues of preferred 
stock in 1950, in an effort to stimulate long-term financing of industry. 
The 1950 law was inevitably a transitional measure. Prior to its passage, there was 
controversy among the Japanese over the fairness of also permitting Kangyo Bank to issue 
debentures when only IBJ had agreed to restrictions on individual deposits. (Ministry of Finance, 
1983, 599, 603) Not only did this issue remain unresolved, but when the Bank of Tokyo proposed 
This was due both to a suspicion of IBJ for its central role in the financing of the war effort 
and an economic judgement that long-term funds should be raised in the capital market. 
TThis was in sharp contrast to earlier policy requiring that special banks make the choice of 
being either commercial banks or bond-issuing companies. Unable to recapitalize, IBJ directors in 
the last half of 1948 faced the danger of liquidation or absorption by another bank. The fact that 
Japanese government support was wavering during this period appears to have contributed to the 
organizational sense of IBJ as a private institution. A historical narrative is to be found in IBJ 
(1957: f.711), contemporaneousdocumentationin MoF (1976: 557-616); personal reminiscences in 
Hazawa (203-223); and drama in an generally accurate historical novel (Takasugi, Vol. 1-2). 
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to issue bonds of their own in 1951, (EBJ, 1957, 893) there arose a more general concern that the 
indiscriminate permission to issue bonds among banks would lead to confusion and oversupply in 
the bond market, and adversely affect the supply of long-term finance.8 (MoF, 1983, 608) 
Meanwhile, the current economic situation was also stimulating further discussion of the the 
long-term credit system. In the Korean War boom in 1951, large city banks were overwhelmed by 
the spiralling funding needs of both their clients and those of the sectors identified by the priority 
production system, and had increasingly resorted to credit from the central bank to meet funding 
needs, a phenomenon dubbed the "overloan problem."* In response to questioning in the Diet in 
February 1952, Minister of Finance Ikeda stated that the current financial system was inadequate, 
and suggested that the establishment of investment banks specializing in long-term finance funded 
by debenture issuance would perhaps be one solution to the problem. (MoF, 1983, 609) 
The government set up a temporary Financial System Council consisting of representatives 
of industry, finance, and academia to examine further reform of the institutions for long-term credit 
in December 1951. After study of various proposals and debate, the Council presented 
recommendations in February 1952 to the Ministry of Finance (IBJ, 144-150; Ministry of Finance, 
1983,610-613). Subsequent to cabinet approval, the Ministry of Finance subsequent submitted a 
8Another important development affecting the future of the bank debenture market occurred 
during the final stages of the establishment of the Japan Development Bank in early 1951. Due to 
last-second objections by occupation authorities as well as the Bank of Japan, it was decided that 
JDB would not be granted special debenture-issuingprivileges as had been previously planned. 
(MoF, 1983, 145) 
TTie four designated priority sectors were those of coal, iron and steel, electric power, and 
shipping. In 1952, the investment of these four industries occupied 44% of all Japanese plant and 
equipment investment, and 70% of all lending for plant and equipment investment from banks 
went to these industries. In the same year, city banks relied on Bank of Japan loans for more than 
10% of their funding needs. Despite Bank of Japan assistance, city banks had begun- to withdraw 
loans to other corporations in non-priority sectors for the purpose of meeting the demand of the 
designated sectors. (Kinyu Seido Chosakai, HI, 7-8) 
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Long-Term Credit Bank Law to the Diet the following month. 
The formal explanation accompanying the proposed law stated that that newly formed 
government institutions such as the Japan Development Bank could be counted on to perform only 
a supplementary role to private institutions in the financing of long-term investment. Specialized 
long-term credit banks would reduce the burden of over-extended city banks in the provision of 
long-term credit and further the protection of depositors. However, in order to secure the smooth 
supply of funds to these institutions, these banks would need to have specialized access to the 
funds, so the 1950 law granting all banks to issue bonds up to 20 times capital was to be abolished. 
(IBJ, 148; MoF, 1983, 612-613) 
Significantly, the neutral status of the long-term credit banks with regard to the city banks 
and their particular clients was considered important at the time: It would make more efficient the 
allocation of long-term capital and faciliate mutually beneficial relations between the long-term 
credit banks and city banks. It was also viewed that neutrality would assure that any indirect 
government funding of priority sectors that occured through the long-term credit banks would in 
turn be provided to the private sector on a basis independent of any particular group affiliation. 
(Takenaka, 61-62) By contrast, the idea that securities markets should serve as the supplementary 
source of long-term debt was given little serious consideration.10 
One important aspect of the plan which was discussed at numerous stages of the 
deliberations was how many long-term credit banks there should be. Due to economies of scale in 
10A compelling argument made in Teranishi and elsewhere is that the scarcity of financial 
capital made impractical the dependence on securities markets for the provision of long-term 
capital. For evidence on the scarcity of financial capital in the Japanese economy around 1950, see 
Teranishi, 413-417. This also was the stated belief of the Ministry of Finance at the time of the 
promulgation of the long-term credit bank law in 1952. (Takenaka, 60) The postwar experience of 
high inflation had also left savers (investors) wary of longer-term bonds. 
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* the provision of long-term credit, and perceived limitations in the demand for bank debentures, the 
general opinion was that few rather many banks should be established, though a monopoly was to 
be avoided. In addition to IBJ, the two other former special banks were viewed as prime 
candidates; however, the Kangyo Bank and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank were unwilling to forgo 
their commercial banking business for the sake of retaining their debenture-issuingprivileges. 
Instead, they promised to contribute personnel and capital to a newly established long-term credit 
bank, and preparations for the creation of a new bank were begun with the active assistance of the 
financial community. (Ministry of Finance, 1983: 598, 608-616) 
The Long-Term Credit Bank Law passed the Diet in June, and was enacted in December 
1952, while the law permitting debenture issue by all banks was abolished. The Industrial Bank of 
Japan (IBJ) moved immediately to charter itself as a long-term credit bank, and simultaneously, a 
Long-Term Credit Bank (LTCB) was created out of the long-term lending divisions of the Kangyo 
Bank and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank. A third bank based on the remnants of the colonial Bank 
of Chosen (Korea), was chartered as a long-term credit bank in 1957 as Nippon Fudosan Bank, 
later renamed the Nippon Credit Bank. (NCB) Thereafter the number of long-term credit banks 
has been fixed for the past 35 years at three. 
2.2 The Long-term Credit Bank Law (1952) 
2.2.1 Provisions Constraining the Scope of Business. The scope of business which 
the long-term credit bank may perform is limited by Article 6 of the Long-Term Credit Bank Law. 
Its principal business is defined to be the making of loans, discounting of bills, acceptance of bills, 
and provision of guarantees with regards to long-term working capital or plant and equipment 
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capital.11 (Art. 6.1.1) Long-term credits (defined as longer than six months) for other purposes 
may be provided only if they are secured by real estate (Art. 6.2), and short-term credits for any 
purpose may be provided only to the extent they do not exceed the total of the bank's deposits or 
similar accepted money. By contrast, the city banks are not limited by law in their mix of long and 
short-term finance. (Table 1) 
The limitation on short-term finance to the quantity of deposits is made the more binding 
by the fact that unlike the city banks, long-term credit banks in principle are not to be deposit-
taking institutions. The acceptance of deposits is limited to borrowing customers, companies for 
which the bank acts as trustee, and government institutions. (Art. 6.1.3) 
2.2.2 The Right to Issue Financial Debentures. (Art. 8-12)12 Banks charted under 
the long-term credit bank law are granted compensation for the above constraints in the form of 
the right to issue long-term financial debentures with a maturity of 5 years.13 These coupon 
debentures, combined with the prevention of the creation of deposit instruments of similar length 
by the city banks,14 has been central to the segmentation of short and long-term finance in Japan. 
nIn addition to the provision of credit, a long-term credit bank may act as a trustee for the 
flotation of local and corporate bonds, and perform foreign exchange transactions (Article 6.1.4-5), 
rights which the city banks also possess. 
12Those readers desiring a more complete English language overview of the bank debenture 
market are referred to Doi (1990). 
^Since November 1991, the long-term credit banks, as well as Norinchukin and Shoko Chukin 
Bank, have also been allowed to issue 2-year bank debentures. This was part of a larger 
liberalization policy which granted city banks permission to sell 3-year large-lot time deposits. 
14The allowed term of the fund procurement of the city banks has only been gradually 
lengthened. A two-year term deposit was approved in 1971, a three year quasi-term deposit (with 
the right to withdrawal after one year) in 1981, and a large-lot 3-year deposit in 1991. Loan 
trusts, the principal source of lendable funds for the trust banks, come in five year maturities, but 
operate as variable-rate instruments. 
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The long-term credit banks may also issue discount debentures which are 1 year in maturity. Both 
coupon and discount debentures are issued on a monthly basis, and are granted numerous forms of 
preferential treatment to assure smooth issuance and a secure source of funds. (Table 2)15 
Article 8 allows debentures to be issued within the limit of an amount of 30 times16 the 
total of capital and reserves, far larger than the two times capital limit stipulated for ordinary 
corporate debentures. These bonds, unlike those of the great majority of Japanese corporations 
until recently, may be unsecured. The bonds are bearer bonds unless otherwise requested (Art. 
11.2) which gives them added liquidity, and has facilitated their use as collateral for call money and 
Bank of Japan borrowings. 
Issuing procedures are also much simpler than those required for ordinary corporate bonds. 
While ordinary corporations cannot start subscription until application is submitted to and approval 
granted by the Ministry of Finance, bank debenture issuers only have to report the amount and 
terms.17 (Art. 10) Article 11 provides the issuers of financial debentures with another advantage: 
the capability for reduced issuance (gengaku hakko). While according to the Commercial Code, 
ordinary corporate bonds issues must be called off when the amount subscribed does not reach the 
total amount of the issue, financial debenture issues can be adjusted downward depending on the 
level of subscription, which permits a continuous issuance of financial debentures regardless of 
I^n addition to the long-term credit banks, three other institutions are allowed to issue 
financial debentures: the Central Cooperative Bank for Agriculture and Forestry f Norm Chuo 
Kinko), the Central Cooperative Bank for Commerce and Industry (Shoko Chukin Chuo KinkoV 
and the Bank of Tokyo. The first two of these banks provide funds primarily for small farms and 
businesses. The Bank of Tokyo's coupon debentures may have a maturity of only 3 years. 
"The original limit of twenty was raised in 1981. 
17This parallels the practice in the U.S. bond market of "shelf registration," a privilege which 
has been granted since 1981 to all U.S. issuers of corporate bonds. 
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unexpected financial conditions. 
Finally, bank debentures, unlike other corporate bonds, can be sold without subscription 
(uridashi), whereby investors may buy them at any period during the month preceding the issue, 
and obtain the certificates immediately upon payment. This allows purchasers to forgo the 
preparation of application forms, and promotes sales to the general public. Approximately 70% of 
coupon and all discount debentures are sold in this manner. 
2.3 The Evolution of the Primary Market for Financial Debentures. The rates on issued 
coupon debentures are set by an informal cartel consisting of the long-term credit banks, the three 
other institutions which issue bank debentures, and the trust banks.18 Changes in the rate follow 
close consultation with the Ministry and Finance and the Bank of Japan. Since the introduction of 
a long-term prime rate as the standard minimum rate for long-term loans, the long-term prime has 
been set at a fixed spread over the debenture rate.19 
Given the fixed spread and the existence of excess demand for long-term investment 
financing during the high-growth era20, the profitability of the long-term credit banks depended on 
18Trust banks are included in the negotiations as the prospective dividend rate on trust 
certificates offered by the trust banks is fixed at 2 basis points above the prevailing bank coupon 
rate. The actual rate of return on trust certificates is variable. (Pressnel, 225) Over time, secondary 
market yields on debentures have also come to play a role in determining a prime rate change, and 
now the coupon rate (and thus the long-term prime) is usually revised when the lowest yield on the 
debentures differs by 0.2 percentage point or more from the coupon rate. 
19This spread started at 1.4%, moved to 1% in 1966, and has been fixed at 0.9% since 1968. 
Though traditionally the long-term prime has served as the lower limit for long-term lending, since 
the mid-80s, discounts from the long-term prime have become less exceptional. (Suzuki, 146-147) 
In April 1991, city and regional banks began to set individually their own long-term prime rates 
(linked to the short-term prime), at rates significantly higher than those charged by the long-term 
credit banks. 
*The well-known city bank practice of rolling over short-term loans suggests that firms desired 
more long-term credit than they got; for other evidence that the long-term credit market was out 
of equilibrium, see Teranishi, 505-515. 
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the successful issuance of coupon debentures. However, as an integral part of the structure of 
regulated interest rates,21 the coupons on financial debentures did not reflect equilibrium rates. 
The subscription rate was below market rates - not only well below the short-term call rate 
(Shimura, 1980: 219), but consistently below the yield on bank coupon debentures in the secondary 
markets. (Teranishi: 455-456) In such an environment, the generation of demand in the primary 
market for coupon debentures was not a trivial issue. 
2.3.1 The Era of Trust Fund Bureau Purchases. In the early fifties, the long-term 
credit banks depended principally on the debenture purchases of the Trust Fund Bureau (Shikin 
Unyobu) of the Ministry of Finance. Between 1952 and 1955, the Trust Fund Bureau bought close 
to 50% of issued coupon debentures. (Exhibit 1) 
However, the dependence on the government as the principal purchaser of coupon bonds 
was destined to be short-lived. In June 1955, the Trust Fund Bureau temporarily ceased the 
purchase of new issues, and requests were made by the Ministry of Finance to the local and city 
banks to compensate with an increase in their own purchases. Reasons for the withdrawal of Trust 
Fund Bureau participation included the increased burden of purchasing municipal bonds, and the 
funding of public corporations and the Japan Development Bank. (IBJ: 221-222; Sup. Vol.: 372). 
Although the Trust Fund Bureau continued to refinance their previous purchases and would 
from time to time make new purchases of financial debentures explicitly tied to sector-specific 
21See Teranishi for detailed description and analysis of the structure of regulated interest rates 
during the high-growth era. (451-506) 
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loans,22 the ratio of their purchases to all coupon debentures issued sharply declined to below 10% 
of all issues by 1959, and after a resurgence to 10-20% levels in 1961-63 declined to single digit 
levels thereafter. 
2.3.2 The Purchases of City Banks and Other Banking Institutions. Accompanying 
the decline in the importance of Trust Fund Bureau purchases, purchases of issues increased by 
private banks, in particular the city banks. Between 1956 and 1965, city banks averaged 45% of all 
purchases of issued coupon bonds. (Exhibit 1) Three principle factors were responsible: 
(1) Regulation of Deposit Rates. Although the rates of interest on bonds 
were not as great as what a city bank could have received in providing long-term funds to a 
company, they were nonetheless always substantially above regulated time deposit rates. This 
enabled banks to hold bonds at a profit despite their low rates of interest. (Shimura, 1980: 230) 
(ii) Cooperative Financing. fKvocho Yushi) A practice evolved whereby 
city banks could expect financing for their preferred customers from the long-term credit banks in 
return for their purchases of the coupon bonds. Apparently, a rule of thumb was for the long-
term credit banks to make loans to the city bank's preferred customers of approximately double the 
amount of bond purchases of that city bank. (Patrick, 1972: 125) City banks could also expect a 
flow back of deposits from customers able to obtain financing from the long-term credit banks. 
(Shimura, 1980: 254) A similar sort of mechanism was at work encouraging the debenture 
purchases by the smaller regional banks. In compensation for purchasing bonds, they would be 
^ o r example, a 1958 purchase of 10 billion yen of long-term bank debentures by the Trust 
Fund Bureau went to long-term loans to steel and shipping in a predetermined 40/60 ratio. (IBJ: 
348). In 1961 another purchase of 5.5 billion yen (followed by 3 billion yen in 1962) occurred for 
the funding of electric power and steel. In 1963, there followed a purchase of bonds tied to 6 
billion yen of loans to the machine tool industry. (541). 
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made the agents of long-term credit bank loans to customers in their local region.23 
(±±±) Access to Bank of Japan Credit. Financial debentures could be 
used as collateral for Bank of Japan loans upon which city banks remained heavily dependent.24 
When the Bank of Japan shifted its emphasis to market operations in the early 60's as a means of 
supplying liquidity to the system, coupon debentures were made one of the categories of eligible 
paper. Thus, as rates in the secondary market meant that issues could be disposed of only at a 
loss, it was Bank of Japan policy which made the debentures liquid and encouraged the use of 
coupon debentures by city banks as a reserve instrument. Further, the fact that credit from the 
Bank of Japan was substantially below market rates implied that the costs of coupon debenture 
purchases could be effectively recouped in the form of Bank of Japan subsidies.25 
^Shimura, 1980: 255. Further discussion of the agency loan system is in part 3 of this paper. 
Government policy also played a role in financial debenture purchases by regional banks and other 
financial institutions. When city banks were less willing to buy debentures during tight money 
periods, the government would encourage the local banks to turn away from the call money 
markets and buy more financial debentures. (D3J: 545) To provide further incentives for 
diversification of the long-term banks' fund sources, sogo banks and credit cooperatives were 
allowed to be representatives of agency loans in 1954 and 1959, respectively. 
*As of June 1964, more than 40% of the outstanding Bank of Japan loans were collateralized 
by financial debentures. (Takenaka: 72) 
^Ironically, while long-term credit banks were in part created to cure the "over-loan problem," 
city bank dependence on the Bank of Japan credit was systematically related to the fund supply of 
the long-term credit banks during this period. Teranishi has documented that for 1966-1977, Bank 
of Japan subsidies to city banks were approximately equal to what they passed on to all bond 
issuers in terms of the purchase of overpriced bonds. Approximately 45% of the estimated "tax" of 
aggregate bond holdings was due to the holdings of financial debentures, a figure which 
undoubtedly was greater during the early stages of the high growth period. (483-489) 
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2.3.3 Discount Bonds and the Increasing Importance of Individual Investors.2* While 
financial institutions were the principal purchasers of coupon debentures during the high growth 
era, individual investors were being courted as purchasers of one-year discount bonds.27 The 
importance of discount bonds during the high-growth era should not be underestimated. 
Constituting between 20-30% of the outstanding volume of all financial debentures (Exhibit 2), they 
served the role of a buffer to changes in demand for coupon debentures, and stabilized the overall 
quantity of funds that could be raised by the long-term credit banks. In times of monetary 
tightening, when city banks would cut back on their purchases of coupon debentures, the long-term 
credit banks would meet funding needs by increasing the sales of discount bonds. (Shimura, 1980: 
227-229) 
The rate on discount bonds was set at exactly the same level as one-year time deposits. 
What made them even more attractive in 1955 was the introduction of a system in which securities 
companies were allowed to borrow for a fee the discount bonds of their customers, which they 
would then use as collateral in the call money market to finance stock purchases. (Unvo Azukaii 
or "use trusts") In 1965, nearly 85% of all oustanding discount bonds had been sold through 
securities houses.28 (Exhibit 3) 
However, the unvo azukari system was abolished in 1965 when it become clear that 
*In the Japanese bond statistics, the category of individuals is aggregated with that of non-
financial corporations (and foreign investors). In practice, many corporate purchasers are wealthy 
individuals who both own and manage a small or medium-sized company, so the use of the term 
"individual" is not as misleading as it may seem. A recent case in point is the purchase and now 
infamous misuse of BBJ discount debentures by restaurant owner and proprietress Nui Onoue. 
discount bonds can be traced back to a 1920 financial crisis when issuance was allowed E3J 
to assist in the undertaking of emergency financing to distressed companies. (DBJ: 38) 
^Inflation also gradually increased the attractiveness of the discount bonds, by bringing the 
10,000 yen unit within the reach of individual investors. 
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Yamaichi Securities had become insolvent and an industry crisis precipitated in no small part 
through abuse of the system. (Adams and Hoshii: 170-172) New measures were needed to 
increase the marketability of discount bonds. In 1967, the rate on discount bonds was lifted to a 
few basis points above the one-year time deposit rate. The same year, a new tax system was 
introduced whereby taxes on coupon bonds were limited to a 5% withholding tax upon issuance, 
which compared favorably with the withholding tax rate on interest income and dividends of 15-
20%. 
Another important transition in the discount bond market followed the gradual expansion 
of the long-term credit banks own retailing efforts. The long-term credit banks, which distributed 
only 15% of their own discount bonds in 1965, had raised that proportion to more than 50% in 
1985. By 1985, the proportion of discount bonds among outstanding financial debentures had 
increased to more than 35%. (Exhibits 2-3) 
While individual investors have consistently accounted for more than 95% of the purchases 
of the discount bond market, a more recent development is their occupation of the principal 
investor category for coupon debentures (Exhibit 1). The decline in the role of city banks in this 
market was set off by the issuance of government bonds in 1966. City banks dramatically slowed 
down their purchases of new bank debentures, both because of the burden placed on them to 
underwrite government bonds, and because the Bank of Japan removed financial debentures from 
their open market intervention account. The attractiveness of coupon bond purchases having been 
drastically reduced, in 1967 city banks started actively selling large quantities of their holdings of 
outstanding bank debentures. (IBJ, 732-734) The decline in their relative holdings has been steady 
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since the mid-60's, and now approaches only 5% of outstanding issues.29 
On the other hand, local banks and other financial institutions, which never were as 
dependent on Bank of Japan financing as the city banks, and unlike the city banks have generally 
had more funds than lending opportunities, maintained their relative proportion of financial 
debenture purchases even after the end of the high-growth era. 
The decline in sales to city banks has been made up through large increases in the sale of 
coupon debentures to individuals. (Exhibit 2) Some factors behind these increases have been tax-
related: most recently the search by savers for alternative instruments in the wake of the 
elimination of the Maruyu system.30 Marketing efforts have also intensified: in 1981 a new and 
very popular type of coupon debenture was introduced by the long-term credit banks, which 
effectively was a zero-coupon debenture.31 One IBJ strategy has been to go after the savings of 
workers of their large corporate clients such as Hitachi and Kansai Electric. (IBJ: 1076-1079) 
An important feature of discount and coupon bonds for some individual investors has been 
that they are in bearer form, and can be purchased anonymously. This facilitates the evasion of 
estate and income taxes;32 further, the purchase of financial debentures can be used as a means of 
laundering illicit income. However, in response to public concern, measures have been recently 
^Another factor behind the city banks' withdrawal from the bank debenture market since the 
early-70's has been the active pursuit and use of funds for new lending opportunities in the small 
and medium-sized business sector. 
^Also, in 1974, the maximum amount of debenture holdings whose interest could be exempt 
from income taxation was raised from 15 to 30 million yen. 
31Called "wides", the interest on these instruments is compounded semi-annually, and one 
complete payment made upon maturity. 
^Around 10% of the 221 billion yen in concealed income identified in tax-evasion cases filed 
by the National Tax Administration Agency between 1989-1991 was accounted for by financial 
debentures. (Nikkei Weekly, 3/15/93) 
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taken to curb the abuse of the anonymity feature of financial debentures.33 
The maintenance of a steadily growing demand for financial debentures has been a 
significant achievement for the long-term credit banks, particularly since the decline in city bank 
purchases and the emergence of significant competition in the form of government debt. Though 
they now share the spotlight with government bonds, financial debentures retain a dominant share 
of the Japanese bond market. (Exhibit 4) This achievement has been the result of important tax 
and regulatory changes at critical moments of transition in the market, intensified marketing efforts 
by the institutions themselves, and the full exploitation of those advantages originally given to 
financial debentures in the 1952 law, as well as the continued repression of competitive instruments 
such as longer-term deposits or five-year corporate bonds. 
Will this form of financing persist as an effective source of funds for long-term credit banks 
as more competitive instruments emerge as part of efforts to deregulate the financial system? 
Although developments in the secondary market may lead to differing costs of capital among the 
long-term credit banks in line with their credit ratings,34 the history of Japanese regulatory practice 
suggests that any systemic damage done to the fund-raising capabilities of long-term credit banks by 
33The Finance Ministry issued a directive in 1990 to financial institutions which required that 
they confirm the identities of clients involved in transactions of more than 30 million yen. The 
Kanemaru case, in which at least a few billion yen of undeclared political donations were used to 
buy discount bonds, suggests that further reform may be necessary. Kanemaru had been able to 
circumvent the new identification rule through the cooperation of a securities company which 
divided his purchasing orders into small lots which were bought from different bank branches. 
34Throughout the post-war era, the long-term credit banks have issued their financial 
debentures at identical coupon rates, a process supported in the secondary market by identical 
yields. However in June 1992, there emerged significant gaps in the market yields of the five-year 
debentures of the three long-term credit banks, reflecting in particular worsening news about the 
condition of NCB's non-bank affiliates. Given common coupon rates, future subscription to NCB 
issues by major investors such as insurance companies are likely to occur at discounts from par, 
implying a higher cost of capital. Whether this condition is temporary or not depends for the most 
part on the rehabilitation of NCB. 
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liberalization measures will be gradual, and compensated for by relaxed restrictions of their own 
activities in other areas.35 
The next section of this paper shifts focus to the asset side of the long-term credit banks' 
balance sheet. How has their steady growth translated into patterns in the financing of corporate 
clients? And what role have they come to play within the Japanese main bank system, either as 
participants, or as lead banks themselves? 
III. Cooperative Financing of the Long-Term Credit Banks 
To a greater degree than the other large banks in the Japanese financial system, the long-
term credit banks have been involved in two types of joint, cooperative financing. First, they have 
worked with government financial institutions, particularly the Japan Development Bank, in policy-
oriented financing projects. Second, they have provided supplementary long-term finance to leading 
companies in all of the enterprise groups, as well as those few not so affiliated. 
3.1 Cooperative Financing with the Japan Development Bank. During the period when 
the Trust Fund Bureau was the principal purchaser of financial debentures, most of the funds 
supplied by the long-term credit banks were targeted to the designated priority industries of coal 
mining, steel, electric power, and shipping. The principal partner of the long-term credit banks in 
^See footnote 13. The case of the government bond market suggests that new entry into the 
bond markets can be managed to increase the overall market more than cut into the debenture 
issues of the long-term credit banks. As for the loss of borrowers that further development of the 
corporate bond market may entail, long-term credit banks may well be compensated by an 
increased growth in their fees from bond underwriting and trading of straight bonds, privileges 
granted in 1993. 
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this activity was the Japan Development Bank (JDB). Of the nearly three hundred billion yen in 
loans supplied by JDB to industry between 1951 and 1956, nearly 85% went to the priority sectors. 
(JDB, 1993: 167) In 1956, of the outstanding plant and equipment loans to these sectors by city 
banks, long-term credit banks, trust accounts, and JDB, the JDB accounted for nearly 45%, as 
compared to 30% for the long-term credit banks. (IBJ: 203-208) Among the priority sectors, 
funding from the long-term credit banks was greater only in steel. (Table 3) 
However, even during its early history, the role of the Japan Development Bank in 
determining the direction of Japan's credit flows should not be overestimated. Unlike its 
predecessor, the Reconstruction Finance Bank (RFB), the Japan Development Bank was not 
allowed to provide working capital loans, which often made loans in coordination with private 
banks a necessity. In addition, the legal mandate of JDB actively encouraged cooperation with the 
private banking system.36 
Another relevant point is that in its early years as a nascent institution, JDB relied heavily 
on the expertise in credit analysis of staff and directors seconded from other financial institutions, 
particularly IBJ. The Reconstruction Finance Bank had in fact been founded as a division within 
the Industrial Bank of Japan in August 1946, and a total of 127 personnel were seconded from IBJ 
during its brief lifetime. (MoF, 1978, 627-631; IBJ, 106) In addition to some personnel carried over 
from the RFB, upon its formation the JDB depended further upon the expertise of staff and 
directors seconded from the Industrial Bank of Japan, as well as the Kangyo Bank and the Bank of 
^Article 22 of the Japan Development Bank Law states that"... the Japan Development Bank 
shall not compete with banks and other financial institutions with respect to its business 
operations." In an internal JDB memo dated April 1952, it was stated that since JDB credit was 
intended to supplement private bank funding, JDB should "actively undertake cooperative financing" 
with the private banks. (JDB, 1976: 55) 
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Japan.37 
In addition to steel, the long-term credit banks were the principal lenders for investment in 
the other important manufacturing industries such as machinery, chemicals, textiles, cement and 
ceramics. In fact, the establishment of the long-term credit banks was a principal reason that the 
financing to industries other than the priority industries fell from 20% of JDB loans in the early 
fifties to 10% in the mid-fifties. According to JDB historians, there was a reduction in the number 
of industries targeted for funding by the JDB starting in 1953 "because the enactment of the Long-
Term Credit Bank Law had resulted in the inauguration of private long-term financial institutions 
which could devote themselves to the long-term financing of the remaining industries." (JDB, 1993: 
163, 167) Long-term credit banks provided more than twice the funds of JDB in those "non-
priority" manufacturing industries in 1956, and nearly five times as much 10 years later.38 
The company-specific loan data presented in Table 4 yield similar implications. We see a 
strong correlation of JDB activity with that of the long-term credit banks: of the 161 listed 
companies which had a long-term credit bank in 1967 as the largest private lender,39 nearly 50% 
37In all, nine individuals including two division chiefs and one section chief were seconded from 
IBJ to the Japan Development Bank upon its formation. A tenth individual, Sohei Nakayama, the 
future president of IBJ, served as a director. Combined with secondments from the Kangyo Bank 
and the Bank of Japan, 27 out of the 46 male employees (not including directors but including 11 
division and section chiefs) of the newly-established JDB were appointed from outside institutions. 
(Takasugi:3,50; IBJ, 139; JDB,1976:44;JDB,1993:154) 
^Although JDB loans towards other industries began to increase again in the late 50's (JDB, 
1993: 180-181), its concentration in the priority sectors in relation to other banks did not change. 
The significant proportions of JDB funding which went into relatively declining industries such as 
coal mining and shipping in the 60s and 70s parallel those proportions for all government funding 
discussed in Hamada and Horiuchi: 243. 
^ o avoid overestimating the importance of the long-term credit banks, we will determine 
company's "lead lender" by aggregating the loans of all financial institutions in the group. Thus, a 
long-term credit bank can be a lead or primary lender only if its loan share exceeds that of each 
keiretsu's aggregate loan share. 
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were also obtaining loans from the Japan Development Bank.40 However, in terms of both 
numbers of firms and the average loan shares, JDB loans were concentrated more heavily than 
those of the other banks in the three areas of mining, electric power, and shipping. In the latter 
two industries, JDB lending averaged more than 3 times that of the leading long-term credit bank, 
and JDB was the lead lender in 16 out of 18 cases. But in the other manufacturing industries, the 
JDB share averaged one-third to one-fourth that of the leading long-term credit bank. 
Divergence was further accelerated in the mid-1960s when JDB expanded its lending for 
social welfare projects such as regional infrastructure. (JDB, 1976: 285-286; JDB, 1993: 198-199) 
The two principal areas of JDB and long-term credit bank cooperation remain shipping and electric 
power. 
Given that the largest lender to a number of the companies in these two industries is JDB 
rather than the long-term credit bank, some might interpret JDB as the main bank.41 However, 
they would be mistaken, for by all the remaining criteria by which the main bank relationship was 
defined in Chapter 1 of this volume, the JDB-firm relationship is either non-existent or weak. By 
statute, JDB is not allowed to own firm shares, provide bond-issue related services, or maintain 
corporate deposit accounts. Finally, though personnel are occasionally seconded to client 
companies, a leadership role in corporate rescues is absent from its history, in all likelihood ruled 
out by the above-mentioned inability to provide working capital finance. 
The above limitations are hardly flaws; in fact, the rather narrow role of JDB can be 
considered part of a successful development bank design based on the precautionary desire to avoid 
*An additional 20% of the Table 4 sample had no JDB loans but financing from other 
government institutions such as the Export-Import Bank. 
41The JDB is also the largest lender to a number of other companies in other industries such 
as All Nippon Airways. 
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the political and inflationary aspects of the RFB experience.42 Although JDB loans usually have 
the longest term and are thus junior in the sense of maturity, they often appear to be treated on a 
senior basis compared to private bank credit in times of financial trouble (JDB, 1993: 134; see also 
Part 4.5.2) In the fifties and early sorties, JDB maintained a write-off ratios of bad loans less than 
both IBJ and ordinary banks. (JDB, 1993:135) Although superior abilities in credit analysis is one 
possible reason, at least part of the performance of JDB loans appear to be related to their status 
in terms of collateral: JDB has often been given the first rank of priority on hypothecs in 
cooperative financing ventures.43 
3.2 Cooperative Financing with the Group Banks. Corporations, both in Japan and 
elsewhere, particularly when they exceed a certain size, tend to spread their borrowings among a 
number of banks. This is hardly inconsistent with the existence of a main bank with specialized 
monitoring capabilities: there are many reasons, not mutually exclusive, and many have been 
discussed elsewhere in this volume.44 Statutory regulations further limit the provision of loans by a 
bank to single large customers - although in Japan only since 1974. (Table 1) 
^ o r a informative table comparing differences of,the RFB and JDB across a variety of 
characteristics, see JDB, 1993: 156; for a history of JDB's establishment see the same source, 154-
160, and MoF, 1983, 95-159. For a detailed historical examination and comparative analysis of the 
performance and roles of development banks in Japan (including IBJ), see Yasuda, 1993. 
*In their book on credit and security in Japan, the two cases that Tanikawa et al cite which 
involve the Japan Development Bank both had the JDB hypothec being of the first rank among 
the loan claims. (113,115) JDB historians also imply that it was not unusual for JDB to "demand 
a superior mortgage ranking in light of the collateral value," see JDB, 1993: 267. In general, 
securing loans with collateral is a practice encouraged by the Japan Development Bank Law, which 
states that all granting of credit "be deemed to be reliable" (Art 18-1-2), and the Statement of 
Business Methods, Article 6 of which states that all loans should be secured by real estate, floating 
mortgages, or other collateral whenever possible. (JDB, 1976: App., 36) 
"A reason particularly relevant to the U.S. system where the securitization of loans has 
advanced is differing costs of capital among banks. (Gorton and Pennachi: 1990) 
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In the case of Japan, another clear motivation for the division of loans to specific 
companies was set in place by the Long-Term Credit Bank Law. Based upon the principle of 
specialization of long-term finance, it encouraged companies, regardless of group affiliation, to 
depend on the long-term credit banks for much of their long-term funding needs.45 And through 
the preferential treatment of financial debentures outlined in part 2, it encouraged group banks to 
participate actively in this arrangement. 
The role of long-term credit banks as an independent and supplementary source of long-
term funds to the leading firms across bank groups grew in importance during the period 
corresponding to the city banks' preeminence as debenture purchasers. From 1956 to 1960, the 
long-term credit banks went from providing 34.4% of new term loans for plant and equipment 
investment to 40.6% (from 6.7% to 11.4% of all new loans). Meanwhile city banks dropped from 
providing 29.5% of new loans for investment to 17.6%. (IBJ, 334). In fact, during this period the 
net increase in city banks' coupon debenture purchases was nearly three-quarters the increase in 
city banks' own lending for plant and equipment investment. Especially in the heavy 
manufacturing industries, city banks were increasingly allowing the plant and equipment investment 
needs of their largest customers to be met by the long-term credit banks. (IBJ: 341-343). 
More direct evidence of this phenomenon can be found in the specific loan details 
concerning bank and company loan quantities provided by Keiretsu no kenkvu. Exhibit 5 outlines 
the distribution of outstanding loans to firms listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange in 1965 by each of the 6 major keiretsu banks and the 2 largest long-term credit banks. 
^oshihiro Horiuchi has looked into the breakdown of long and short-term loans by both 
company and bank for specific companies in his study of bank-firm relationships in the synthetic 
fiber industry. (1990) Out of nine companies in 1989, only one had IBJ as an overall lead lender. 
However, six had IBJ as a principal long-term lender, indicating the particular importance of BBJ's 
supplementary role in the synthetic fiber industry. 
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While more than 40% of IBJ's first-section corporate loans and over 50% of LTCB's loans were 
directed to firms of one of the 6 keiretsu groups, the percentage of loans of the group banks to 
companies in the other groups varied between 15 and 30%.* 
The same distinctions are to be found in sharper relief in Exhibit 6: IBJ was the second 
lender for 78 of the companies listed on the first section of Tokyo Stock Exchange in 1967, in 
comparison for an average of 44 for the six group banks. The Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan 
(LTCB), which in terms of loan quantity and companies to which it was the lead lender was and 
remains at a second tier below the group banks,47 was still the second lender in more cases than all 
but IBJ. Even the Nippon Credit Bank (NCB), with only 4 companies to which it was the lead 
lender, was the second largest lender for more than 28 companies. 
Not only did the long-term credit banks loan across city bank groups, but they did so in a 
more even fashion. For instance, while the lowest percentage of lending by IBJ to the companies 
of any one group was 5.8%, Sanwa financial institutions lent only 3% of their funds to Sumitomo 
group firms, Sumitomo financial institutions lent only 1.2% of its funds to the Dai-Ichi group firms, 
and Mitsui financial institutions lent only 2.7% of its funds to Mitsubishi companies. (Shimura, 
1978: 161) 
Just as JDB loans appear to be compensated for their longer and more favorable credit 
terms with seniority in terms of collateral, loans provided by the long-term credit banks appear to 
*At this time, the sixth group was Dai-Ichi (the merger with Kangyo bank occurred in 1971). 
Interestingly, the percentage of loans applied to companies within the group was noticeably smaller 
in the bank groups of Fuyo, Sanwa, and Dai-Ichi (40-49%) compared to the older ex-zaibatsu 
industrial groups of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo (57-70%). This is consistent with studies 
which have found the former bank groups more loosely knit across a wide variety of measures. 
For a review of measures and evidence that less "coherence" implies more serious agency problems 
in financial contracts, see Hoshi and Ito, 1991. 
^efer to discussion and evidence of section 4.1. 
26 
have been compensated for their additional maturity risk48 with a greater proportion of security on 
real estate and floating mortgages. Exhibit 7 compares the fraction of IBJ loans secured by real 
estate and floating mortgages with the similar proportion of all bank loans published in the 
aggregate figures of the Bank of Japan Economic Statistics Annual. Throughout the 60s the IBJ 
percentage remained in the 60-70% range, two to three times the national average.49 
The use of collateral to secure loans is common among all financial institutions in Japan, 
and has served to protect against both risk and morally hazardous actions on the part of the 
borrower.50 The relatively more common practice of securing credit by long-term credit banks may 
be in part responsible for write-off ratios of bad loans consistently lower than those of ordinary and 
^According to rough estimates, the average period on outstanding loans in 1965 for the long-
term credit banks was 4.8 years, compared to 2.9 years for the city banks, and 11.3 years for JDB. 
(JDB, 1993: 132) 
49This is likely related to the fact that a high proportion of IBJ loans were fixed loans for plant 
and equipment, which naturally served as the collateral. The difference remains, though at a 
somewhat lower level, if we include loans secured by stocks and bonds and the "other security" 
category (e.g., 69.8% vs. 45.7% in 1970). By contrast, long-term credit bank loans depend much 
less on third-party guarantees than average (e.g., 23% to 9.4% in 1970). Although some 
institutions regard guarantees as more valuable than mortgages (Corbett: 43), the value of any 
guarantee will vary greatly depending on the quality of the guarantor. Since guarantors can vary in 
quality from the main bank to a related company (in 1975, 7.7% of corporate bankruptcies in 
Japan were caused by allied business failures; Ballon and Tomita: 72) to the president or important 
shareholder, the relative value of a guarantee versus a mortgage will will differ from case to case. 
In the account of Tanikawa et al, the use of guarantees usually involves directors or major 
shareholders. Often there is little examination of the creditworthiness of the guarantor, and a 
guarantors' role is "frequently seen as providing merely another source of pressure on the debtor 
to honor his obligations." (51-52). 
50The "collateral principle" became an important feature of the Japanese financial system in the 
twentieth century, and its development has been described in Suzuki (1987:43-44). Along with 
main bank relationships, it has been called by JDB historians a "systemic characteristic" of the 
Japanese financial system, and has been expressed as follows: "With the goal of safe transactions 
in mind, in principle important financial transactions, such as corporate bond issues, bank loans and 
interbank transactions, will be secured with collateral." (1993:137). 
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trust banks.51 (JDB, 1993: 135) In addition, in the case of a group firm with outstanding debt of 
mixed maturity, the greater security puts the long-term credit bank in a stronger bargaining position 
vis-a-vis main bank lenders if the firm runs into trouble.52 Any reorganization plan involving the 
disposition of those secured firm assets either must pay the secured creditors back at least the 
value of the assets, or obtain the approval of those with senior claims on the assets. And in cases 
where the main bank chooses to let the firm go under, the long-term credit banks, by virtue of 
their senior claim to collateralized assets, are likely to recover the most from the disposal of the 
firm assets.53 
By 1979, the proportion of long-term credit bank loans secured by real estate and floating 
mortgages had declined to 1.5 times the national average. This was related to a growing 
convergence of city and long-term credit bank loan composition by both term and purpose. As 
investment demand declined after the high-growth era, the long-term banks began to lend more on 
a short-term basis. And city banks, spurred by both the gradual (though incomplete) lengthening in 
51As with JDB, superior capabilities in credit analysis may also be a factor behind the lower 
write-off ratios. 
52This contrasts with the situation in the United States, where long-term debt is generally 
provided by a bond market consisting of atomistic investors. Though recent modeling of the debt 
maturity choice based on the U.S. environment has explained this structure by motivating the 
power of better informed banks both to make the refinancing decision and dilute the value of the 
public's long-term debt claim (Diamond, 1991), the case of Japan's long-term credit banks suggest 
that limitations on the ability to dilute long-term claims have been viewed as desirable in the high-
growth environment of postwar Japan. 
53Secured claims are generally treated favorably by Japanese bankruptcy law. (Packer and 
Ryser, 1992) Especially in the mid-60s, a time of a number of large corporate bankruptcies, IBJ 
played a major role in the handling of bankrupt corporations to which they were not the principal 
lender, most notably Sanyo Special Steel. (IBJ: 531-532) Thus, the existence of secured claims by 
long-term credit banks may provide a complementary explanation to implicit contracting models 
discussed in this volume in which the main banks are motivated to act "as if they were junior to 
other lenders in times of distress. 
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the term of their deposits, and a drive to supply the investment needs of small and medium sized 
customers, started to direct longer-term loans toward plant and equipment investment. (Exhibits 8 
and 9) 
In regards to loans for investment financing, the convergence of proportions of the two 
classes of banks is now complete. However, as is evidenced by Exhibit 6, this convergence does not 
appear to have resulted in the sharp decline of the long-term credit banks (BBJ in particular) as 
secondary lenders. Although in the high growth period, city banks acted in concert with the long-
term credit banks in part because they had to, the provision of loans to the same customers by the 
city and long-term banks appears to have outlived its original motivation. 
3.3 Cooperative Financing with Smaller Financial Institutions. As financial institutions 
other than the city banks were important purchasers of debentures, it follows that cooperative 
relationships on the lending side also emerged in part to compensate these institutions for their 
purchases. 
One mechanism was the common use of what were known as agency loans, which 
constituted 12% of all outstanding long-term credit bank loans in 1969. (IBJ: 861) Long-term credit 
banks had the right to make long-term loans to regional customers through the branches of local 
banks, mutual banks, and credit cooperatives. The incentive for the smaller banks was both to 
obtain long-term financing for their preferred customers, and to collect the fixed rate commissions 
as the "agent" for a long-term credit bank loan. Although the system gave the long-term credit 
banks the incentive to supply long-term funds to smaller firms in outlying areas despite their 
relative lack of branch offices, the well-known links to debenture purchases has been at times a 
concern among policy-makers.54 
"For a critical MoF overview (1968) and EBJ rebuttal, see IBJ: 861,864. 
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Another indirect benefit to debenture purchases was that the long-term credit banks would 
give preferred regional banks highly sought-after invitations to participate in large loans to 
prestigious customers. For instance, a large part of a syndicated loan to Hitachi was dispersed by 
IBJ to more than 20 local banks in the late 50s. (BBJ: 336) 
IV. The Long-term Credit Bank as a Main Bank. 
Despite the importance of their role as secondary lenders to firms belonging to the groups 
of other banks, the long-term credit banks, especially the largest and most prestigious of them, the 
Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ), have maintained a large number of relationships with corporations 
in which there is little doubt that they are the main bank. In fact, a subset of these firms are so 
heavily influenced by IBJ loans and personnel appointments that a minor keiretsu group is often 
viewed to have grown up around IBJ (Exhibit 10). 
In addition, IBJ has very close relationships with a number of the largest vertical groups 
which are either independent or only loosely affiliated with the six bank groups: Nippon Steel, 
Nissan Motor, Hitachi.55 IBJ has consistently been the largest single lender to the apex of these 
vertical groups, and as will be discussed later, to an exceptionally large proportion of the listed 
firms within those groups. 
4.1 Bank Loans (s\ In Chapter 1 of this volume, a number of aspects of the relations 
55The three companies which head these groups are the fourth, fifth, and sixth largest 
shareholders of IBJ (Meiji, Nippon, and Dailchi Life Insurance are the lead shareholders). These 
ties pre-date World War n, when IBJ developed close relationships with the new zaibatsu (shinko 
zaibatsu) such as Nissan (the nuclei of which were Nissan Motor and Hitachi), Nippon Chisso, and 
Mori. (IBJ: 50) The relationship with Japan Steel goes far back as well: IBJ headed syndicates for 
distributing and absorbing issues of Japan Iron and Steel Company, which was established in 1934 
by the consolidation of the government's Yawata works and six private firms. (Cohen: 17,26) The 
firm was broken up into two separate entities during the occupation, but reestablished with the 
Yawata/Fuji merger of 1968. (Hadley: 297-298) 
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between a firm and its main bank were introduced. Table 5 compares the three long-term credit 
banks with the city banks across across three of these aspects for the purposes of roughly 
comparing the relative number of "main bank" relationships among the banks at two widely 
separated points in time: 1967 and 1990. One characteristic of these data is that there exists a 
clear differentiation among the long-term credit banks in the number of lead lending relationships 
with listed companies.56 IBJ in 1967 was the lead lender to 70 companies listed on the first 
section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, which was a number comparable with the average of 71 for 
the six major keiretsu groups. Meanwhile, LTCB and NCB lagged far behind the group banks with 
20 and 4 companies, respectively, to which they were the lead lenders, numbers more similar in 
scale to the second tier of city banks. 
Although the distinction between the long-term credit banks in the number of lead lending 
relationships remained evident in 1990, the number of lead lending relationships relative to other 
banks had slipped for IBJ, the number of which was lower than five of the six major groups 
(though still far above any of the other city banks). The numbers for LTCB and NCB remained 
comparable to those of the second tier of city banks, though as with IBJ, somewhat lower on a 
relative scale than 23 years previously.57 
*The lead lender is determined as explained in footnote 39. The above-mentioned 
differentiation has extended to the second section companies as well. For instance, while IBJ was 
the lead lender to 41 companies listed on the second section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange in 1967 
(keiretsu group average: 43 firms), the LTCB was the lead lender to 14 firms and NCB to 12. 
There has also been a consistent difference in the size of the bank firms affiliated with each long-
term credit bank, with net sale approximately 4 times as large on average for IBJ-affiliated firms. 
(Keiretsu no Kenkvu. 1991) 
57The decline in relative position could be interpreted as suggesting that a number of 
companies to which the long-term credit banks were leading lenders in 1967 had returned to the 
keiretsu group fold by 1990. However, a reexamination of the data used in Horiuchi, Packer, and 
Fukuda (1988) of a sample of companies continuously listed from 1963 to 1987 has unearthed no 
such general trend. A more likely explanation is that there is today a greater proportion of listed 
firms from industries in which the long-term credit banks have a relatively low representation, e.g., 
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4.2 The Supply of Management Information and Resources (g). In the area of transfers 
of employees to director positions at related companies, a commonly used indicator of close firm-
bank relationships in Japan, IBJ was and has remained a peer of the six group banks, while the 
numbers for LTCB and NCB are at a lower level comparable with the second tier of city banks. 
In contrast to the lead lender indicator, the relative position of this indicator has not changed 
greatly for IBJ, while it has grown greatly for LTCB. 
Not all director positions are the same. In general, managerial authority in Japanese 
companies in concentrated in either the president (shacho) or chairman (kaicho) position. In terms 
of placement to these positions, IBJ does much better than its city bank counterparts, with 17 
companies compared to 10 for the nearest city bank.58 Similarly, LTCB placements significantly 
exceed those of the second tier of city banks. 
4.3 Shareholding f BV AS is evident in Table 5, in terms of share ownership looked at by 
banks in isolation, IBJ is again a peer of the six group banks, being a principal financial institution 
shareholder in a number of cases comparable to those of the major city banks.59 On the other 
hand, LTCB and NCB lag in stock ownership relative to the second tier of city banks. 
services. 
$
*This suggests that IBJ has had an exceptional pool of employees from which to supply 
managerial resources, and lends some credibility to one of IBJ's many nicknames, The President-
Export Bank" (Shacho Yushutsu GinkoV (Nihon Jitsugvo Shuppansha, 52). IBJ's role in mediating 
mergers (discussed below) may also be responsible. In the case of Japan Line, an IBJ man was 
appointed president in part to smooth over factional disputes resulting from a 1964 merger. 
however, as the IBJ group of closely affiliated companies is not only far smaller but also 
does not include any of two classes of major shareholders in Japan, insurance companies and trust 
banks, there can be no significant comparison with the aggregate cross-shareholdingproportions of 
the keiretsu groups. One recent estimate of the percent of group company shares held by group 
firms ranges from 25% for the Mitsubishi group to 11% for the Sanwa group. (Keiretsu no kenkvu. 
1991) 
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In contrast to its roles of principal lender and supplier of director personnel to related 
companies, the emergence of IBJ as a major bank shareholder in the Japanese economy is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. In the early 60s, despite having a large number of customers, IBJ 
used most of its funds on lending and invested relatively little in the equity of many of its clients. 
Out of the 70 first section firms for which it was the lead lender in 1967, it was not a top ten 
shareholder for nearly one-quarter; further, it held less than 2% in another fifth of the cases. 
(Keiretsu no Kenkvu, 1968) 
However, the shareholding role of the long-term credit banks has increased substantially to 
the point where IBJ overall share ownership now exceeds that of any of the city banks. By 1990, 
IBJ owned an average of 4.3% of the first-section listed companies to which it was a top lender. 
By comparison with 1967, for only 4% of the companies to which it is the lead lender did it not 
own stock, and only in another 6% of the cases did it own less than 2% of the company's shares. 
In common with the other city banks, large shareholding stakes are not limited to 
companies to which it is the lead lender, but extend across a wide range of companies many of 
which are owned in larger proportion by other banks. (Table 5) 
4.4 Payment Settlement Accounts and Bond-Issue Related Services (C.T). A critical feature 
of Japan's long-term credit bank law is that while it prohibits the practice of consumer banking, it 
does not prohibit any of the standard banking practices which are essential to the establishment of 
close firm-bank ties in Japan, and constitute the different dimensions of the main bank relationship 
introduced in Chapter 1. We have already discussed the provision of loans, shareholding, and the 
supply of management information and resources. But allowed activities also include the taking of 
corporate deposits to facilitate payment settlement (a), bond-issue related services (r), the two 
remaining aspects of the paradigmatic main bank relationship. 
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With regards to payment settlement (a), when required to do so, long-term credit banks are 
fully capable of providing the services of their city bank counterparts. Since long-term credit banks 
are limited to accepting deposits from corporate clients and government institutions, one rough 
indication of their activity in this area is the amount of deposits held: in 1960, deposits amounted 
to 17.7% of outstanding loans by EBJ; by 1978, that percentage had increased to 33.3%. (IBJ, 
Supplementary Volume, 26-31). Another more recent and precise indication of their activity in this 
area can be found by looking at the identity of paying bank of bills cleared in clearinghouse data. 
In 1989, about 127 trillion yen of bills were presented at the Tokyo Clearinghouse to be drawn on 
IBJ accounts, and 60 and 47 trillion yen of bills to be drawn on LTCB and NCB accounts, 
respectively. This compared with an average of 232 trillion for the six major city banks and 104 
trillion for the other city banks. (Zenginko Kyokai, 1990)60 
Bond issue related services (r) is another aspect in which long-term credit banks are 
equally capable of solidifying the main bank relationship. Documentation concerning this point is 
provided in another paper of this volume (Hamao and Campbell). With regards to the guarantees 
of straight and warrant attached bonds, as well trustee administration for straight, convertible, and 
warrant bonds, IBJ, just like the six major city banks, is far more likely to be involved if it is the 
lead lender to the company. 
4.5 The Importance of Ties with Vertical Groups. As mentioned above, IBJ has a number 
of close relationships with the heads of large vertical groups which are either independent or only 
*°Whether the somewhat lesser importance of long-term credit banks along this dimension 
compared to others reflects the larger samffle (bills of companies regardless of listing status), the 
fact that their clients may rely less on inter-firm transactions, or in fact, a weaker main bank 
relationship along this dimension cannot be answered without firm-specific data. What the 
clearinghouse data do tell us, however, is that the long-term credit banks are very active as paying 
and collection banks in the nationwide promissory note markets. 
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loosely affiliated with one of the six bank groups. Of course, there are many other vertical groups 
which lie firmly within the bank group axes as well (e.g., the Mitsubishi Electric Group, the 
Sumitomo Metal Industries group). Undoubtedly, firms of a vertical group whose head has a 
strong bank group affiliation will be more likely to have a bank from that group as its principal 
lender* But what extent does membership in certain vertical groups affect the probability of having 
IBJ as the main bank? 
In the interest of abstracting from the biases of industry specialization and size, for each 
company listed on the First or Second Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange to which IBJ was 
identified as the principal lender in 1990, a company from the same industry61 was chosen which 
was closest to the original company in terms of net sales, but did not have a long-term credit bank 
as its lead lender. If no companion could be found within a factor of 2, the original (IBJ-affiliated) 
company was dropped from the sample.62 
Characteristics of the resulting sample are given in Table 6. Predictably, the large majority 
of the non-IBJ-affiliated firms have group Gnancial institutions as their lead lender. While there do 
not appear to be significant differences between IBJ and non-IBJ affiliated firms in terms of 
financial statistics such as the debt-equity ratio, the ratio of loans to debt, or the ratio of bonds 
issued to long-term liabilities, IBJ firms do have a significantly higher ratio of long-term Joans to all 
loans. Convergence of term composition in lending to listed firms by city and long-term credit 
banks does not appear to have occurred. 
61Industry classifications were those in the Japan Company Handbook, 1991 (1): 2-3. 
Predictably, company pairs were the most difficult to construct in the electric power industry, 
where 7 firms to which IBJ was the lead private lender were dropped from the sample. 
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The lending shares are also of interest. While the average of IBJ loan shares significantly 
exceeds that of the individual group banks by more than 6%, differences in the share figures are 
insignificantly different from zero when we compare them to the lending of all financial institutions 
in the relevant bank group. The data related to JDB lending suggest that EBJ-affiliated firms have 
neither an advantage nor disadvantage when it comes to receiving JDB loans. After industry and 
size factors are controlled for, financing from JDB is not greater than average for IBJ-affiliated 
firms, particularly when compared to group bank affiliated firms.*3 
The final two columns indicate the importance of ties with vertical groups. In the first of 
these, we list the number of companies which either have 20% or more of their shares owned by 
another listed company, or are listed as belonging to the vertical group of another listed firm in 
Toyo Keizai's Nihon no Kigvo Grupu, 1991." In the final column, we list the number of those 
vertical-group affiliated firms for which the group head has IBJ as the lead lender. Unlike the 
number of all vertical group affiliates, which differs little for IBJ and non-IBJ firms, the number of 
firms whose group head also had IBJ as its lead lender is significantly larger - by two to three 
times - for the IBJ companies than for the six bank keiretsu. Thus, the strong linkage between 
vertical group membership and the identity of the main bank extends to IBJ. 
4.6 Aspects of the IBJ Record for Borrowing Firms in Financial Distress. Much of the 
main bank literature relates to the role that main banks take when a firm falls into financial 
^However, firms that are affiliated with a smaller city bank are less likely to have JDB 
funding, and firms that are independent are more likely to have JDB funding. The latter result is 
consistent with those of a recent paper on the impact of JDB loans, which found that the impact 
of a JDB loan on borrowing and investment is greater if the firm does not have a main bank. 
(Horiuchi and Sui, 1993) 
"In general, the two categories are the same, though Kigvo Grupu does make a few important 
omissions as well include a few firms which hold less than 20%. 
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distress. In particular, a chapter to follow in this volume addresses this issue in great depth. 
(Sheard) In the following, we provide some further evidence that the Industrial Bank of Japan has 
acted as a main bank for a number of important cases, as well as explore certain aspects of the 
IBJ-led resolution of financial distress that reflect in particular its status as a bank neutral of 
keiretsu affiliation and with special government connections. 
4.6.1 Active Managerial Intervention. As early in the post-war era as May 1953, 
Nippon Yakin Kogyo, a specialty steel manufacturer, averted bankruptcy through the support of 
Bank of Japan and a syndicate of private banks led by IBJ. In what became a case of considerable 
controversy, IBJ forced the president and five other directors to sign a contract agreeing to their 
unanimous resignation and demanded not only that an IBJ employee be made vice-president, but 
also that their hand-picked successor - a president of a competing company in the same industry -
take over the company as president.*5 More than 20 years later, with an IBJ man as president, EBJ 
led a syndicate of banks in providing further financial assistance to this same company, mandating 
internal cost-cutting measures as well as organizing tie-ups and assistance from Showa Denko and 
Nippon Steel. (Sheard, 1989: 415,419) 
Another reknowned case was that of Nittoku Metal Industry, a manufacturer of small 
bulldozers and other industrial machinery, which was listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange, with around 1600 employees. In November 1964, its parent company Nihon Special 
Steel, went bankrupt after its lead banks, Mitsubishi and Daiichi, had rejected IBJ requests to 
*Later in 1953, the Fair Trade Commission heard a suit from a disgruntled Nippon Yakin 
Kogyo director, who charged that the management shakeup consisted a breach of the new Anti-
Monopoly law. The case further gained notoriety when the Asahi newspaper reported charges of 
"financial intimidation" by this same director. Although the FTC did not follow up on the case, it 
did issue a warning to IBJ that certain actions taken had been inappropriate, and minor 
adjustments were made in the makeup of the board. (IBJ: 216-218). 
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rescue the company. By contrast, after sending over a team of four employees to investigate its 
condition, IBJ decided to rescue the subsidiary to which it was the lead lender, supplying the 
necessary amounts of emergency financing, and convincing other banks to refrain from forcing 
default. By the next year, after shopping around,66 IBJ had located a willing partner for a joint 
venture in Sumitomo Machinery, which put the company back on its feet (IBJ, 532) 
A more recent case of active intervention is that of machine tool maker Dcegai Tekko in 
1984, where under a president sent in by IBJ, rationalization measures including asset disposal took 
place, and a joint venture mediated with another firm in the industry, Tsugami. (Sheard, 1989: 420) 
Both this and previous case suggest that an important supplement to IBJ managerial intervention 
has been the search for industrial partners to assist in the rehabilitation of the company, a feature 
to be examined in greater detail below. 
4.6.2 The Search for Merger or Joint Venture Partners. Studies of the keiretsu 
groups often emphasize how intra-group coordination facilitates restructuring and mergers within 
the group (Gerlach, 1992). The main bank leadership role in this regard can be seen as 
substituting for an external takeover market (Sheard, 1989) While EBJ's active intervention is 
consistent with this interpretation, all three of the cases described above illustrate an additional 
element to IBJ's role: the ability to find merger or joint venture partners and negotiate with the 
banks and companies of other groups.67 
"Other candidates which had been approached included Komatsu and Hitachi. For a 
dramatized account of the rescue of Nittoku Metal Industry, see Takasugi, II, 69-107. 
*
7Showa Denko's main bank was Fuji, Sumitomo Machinery's was Sumitomo, and Tsugami's 
was Mitsui. 
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IBJ's position of group neutrality in the mediation of mergers has given it an especially 
prominent role in periods of government encouraged industry rationalization.68 In the automobile 
industry in the mid-60s, IBJ played an important mediator role in the merger of Nissan and Prince, 
negotiating with Sumitomo Bank, the main bank of Prince. (IBJ: 679-681) In the drastic 
rationalization of the shipping industry in 1964, IBJ acitvely mediated two of the six mergers, one 
of which involved a firm listed in the Mitsubishi group, and another of which involved close 
cooperation with the Daiichi Bank.69 (Keiretsu no Kenkvu. 1961; BBJ:470-478) 
Of course, the range of IBJ main bank clients is large enough that there often occur 
mergers and tieups of companies both of which have IBJ as their main bank. Shortly after the 
Yakin Kogyo incident in 1955, IBJ assisted another special steel client, Daido Special Steel in the 
midst of a credit crunch and mediated a merger with Shin Riken. (IBJ: 203-204) Though not an 
outright merger, a significant capital alliance which IBJ later put together after the Nissan/Prince 
merger in the same industry was between Nissan and another company for which IBJ acted as the 
main bank, Fuji Heavy Industries. (IBJ, 684) In the early seventies, IBJ helped to mediate a 
merger between two of the largest companies in the paper and pulp business - Sanyo and 
Kokusaku pulp. (IBJ, 933) 
IBJ also played a major role in the single most significant industrial merger of the post-war 
era: that of Yawata and Fuji Steel to form New Japan Steel in 1969. Working in cooperation 
with M m , they not only acted as an intermediator in the corporate negotiations, but also proposed 
the necessary spinoffs and technological agreements to satisfy the FTC, including a sale of a 
*By contrast, major merger cases involving different companies of the six bank keiretsu are 
almost unheard of. In a study of 63 major merger cases in Japan between 1953 and 1973, one 
researcher has found that only one occurred between companies of different lrigvo shudan. 
(Iwasaki: 503) 
*The first of the merged firms became Japan Line, the IBJ main bank client discussed below. 
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segment of the business to NKK, a firm to which they were a major, though not lead, lender. 
Throughout the highly public debate which surrounded the merger of the two largest firms in the 
Japanese steel industry, D3J made a strong case for its benefits. (688-705) 
4.6.3 The Securities Industry Crisis. EBJ's special relationship with the government 
has also meant that they are often called on to represent the private financial sector in industry 
crises of national significance. IBJ's central role in the Japanese economy was no more evident 
than during the financial crisis of the securities industry in 1964-1965, which surfaced dramatically in 
the insolvency of Yamaichi Securities. EBJ men were brought in as presidents for all of the Big 
Four securities companies except Nomura. When Yamaichi's situation worsened, EBJ negotiated a 
rehabilitation plan which involved employee layoffs as well as the suspension and reduction of 
interest payments together with the two other lead banks of Mitsubishi and Fuji. When it became 
apparent that investor confidence was beyond repair without government assistance, IBJ successfully 
lobbied for special relief financing from the Bank of Japan. A smaller securities firm Oi (now 
Wako) was saved in similar fashion, and IBJ played a further intemediary role in the merger of 
three troubled securities firms to form Shin Nihon Shoken.70 
4.6.4 The Case of Japan Line. The record of IBJ intervention of course is far 
longer than the small number of major cases briefly discussed above. Neither have large and 
important cases been limited to the high-growth era, as the very recent case of Japan Line to be 
discussed in a later chapter of this volume illustrates. (Sheard, appendix) A few aspects of this 
case are worthy of additional mention here.71 
^A dramatized account of DBJ's role in the securities industry crisis is to be found in Takasugi 
(IV, 262-298); IBJ's official account is to be found in its history (780-783). 
^Source articles are to be found Japan Economic Journal 12 Dec. 1986, 17 June, 1989, Nikkei 
News Bulletin (on Nikkei telecom) 11 May, 1989. See also citations in Sheard, appendix. 
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First, the characteristic IBJ search across groups for a merger partner for Japan Line was 
part of the end game. The IBJ-selected merger partner was Yamashita-Shin Nihon, for which IBJ 
was the second largest lender and bank shareholder after Sanwa Bank. A merger followed intense 
negotiations with Sanwa Bank, where IBJ agreed to further writeoffs of its outstanding loans as a 
condition of the merger. 
Secondly, even though JDB consistently had more loans on an absolute basis than IBJ, 
there appears to have been little question that IBJ was the bank primarily responsible for managing 
the crisis, and all indications are that EBJ took the leadership role and bore a greatly 
disproportionate share of the losses. Outstanding JDB loans may have lent a political aspect to 
the case which IBJ probably was able to take advantage of. Both during the many years of 
restructuring which preceded the merger, and after the merger, EBJ lobbied hard with the Ministry 
of Finance, including personal meetings with then Finance Minister Miyazawa, to obtain permission 
for most of the debt-writeoffs to be taken as deductions from taxable income. 
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V. Conclusion. 
In this paper on the role of the long-term credit banks, we have deliberately focused on its 
positive aspects. Both in terms of providing an active and knowledgeable participant in the 
syndication of credits, and in terms of providing a counterbalance to inward-looking aspects of the 
city bank groups, the long-term credit banks have been an important part of the main bank system. 
Acting at times in the capacity of independent development banks and and at times in the capacity 
of main banks, the long-term credit banks have been heavily involved in both the financing of 
growing sectors and the restructuring of troubled ones. In particular, as befits its size and history, 
the role of IBJ has been central. 
Nonetheless, it should be kept in mind that a major reason the long-term credit banks have 
maintained a prominent position in the Japanese financial system - for all their ability in credit-
analysis and the provision of long-term funds - has been the successful maintenance of a strong 
demand for their financial debentures. Part of this success has been the result of law and public 
policy, and another part has been due to the marketing efforts of the long-term credit banks 
themselves. One of the important post-war achievements of the long-term credit banks was the 
cultivation of new classes of purchasers once government bonds came on the scene. 
For the past 40 years, financial policymakers in Japan have chosen not to present the long-
term credit banks with the additional challenges that an unregulated domestic bond market would 
undoubtedly bring about. Any historical assessment of the role of the long-term credit banks must 
place the very real contributions made to Japanese economic growth alongside the costs of a 
corporate bond market which as of the early 90s was still underdeveloped. But given the choice of 
a bank-led financing system, which also encourages very close bank-company relations, it is this 
author's opinion that the role of the long-term credit banks has been indispensable. 
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